criticalCertificate expired 936 days ago (2024-04-07)
It expired 936 days ago (2024-04-07): browsers show a full-page warning, most visitors leave, and API or app integrations fail without a clear reason.
Public security report
43/100
A means lowest risk and F means highest, like a school report card. How the score is calculated →
Scanned 2026-10-30 · 24 issue(s) found · 7 checks passed
CyberTrust assessed petrochina.com.cn passively — using only information that is publicly visible on the internet: DNS records, certificates, response headers and reachable services. The result is 43/100, grade F, where A means lowest risk and F means highest, like a school report card.
Email spoofing is possible: no DMARC record was found for petrochina.com.cn, so anyone can send mail that appears to come from @petrochina.com.cn.
Strongest area: reputation and credential exposure (100/100). Weakest area: TLS encryption and certificates (0/100).
24 issue(s) need attention (1 critical, 6 high, 5 medium, 12 low), while 7 checks passed.
51 subdomain(s) of petrochina.com.cn resolve publicly.
| Area | Score | Grade | Issues |
|---|---|---|---|
| DNS hygiene | 84 | B | 2 |
| email spoofing defences (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) | 36 | F | 4 |
| external attack surface | 32 | F | 3 |
| IP threat intelligence | — | — | 0 |
| reputation and credential exposure | 100 | A | 0 |
| TLS encryption and certificates | 0 | F | 9 |
| HTTP security headers | 40 | F | 6 |
It expired 936 days ago (2024-04-07): browsers show a full-page warning, most visitors leave, and API or app integrations fail without a clear reason.
Without it, spoofed mail is usually delivered as normal and you receive no visibility at all; bulk senders are also required by major mailbox providers to publish DMARC.
1 actively exploited vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-11023) match versions seen on 223.69.170.30; working exploits exist and attackers scan for them at scale.
This certificate cannot be chained (unable to get local issuer certificate), so visitors get a warning - and repeated warnings teach people to click through, which defeats warnings during real attacks.
RC4 is prohibited by standard and has practical attacks that recover plaintext such as cookies.
Only deprecated protocols are supported, so browsers refuse to connect outright - visitors cannot open the site at all.
SSLv3 suffers from POODLE, which can recover plaintext such as cookies and credentials; it is prohibited by standard and offers no compatibility benefit today.
3 known vulnerabilities are inferred on 223.69.170.30; even un-weaponised ones leave the system open to every published technique. Version-based inference - treat as a patch-currency signal.
Versions TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 are formally deprecated, fail PCI DSS requirements and are no longer supported by modern browsers; they also enable downgrade attacks and fail compliance audits.
64-bit block ciphers are vulnerable to SWEET32 after enough data on one connection, and 3DES is no longer accepted by compliance standards.
Without it, anyone who later obtains the private key can decrypt everything they recorded earlier.
Without it, an attacker can strip SSL on the first HTTP request and keep the user on plaintext (SSL stripping), a common attack on public Wi-Fi.
The server does not staple the certificate revocation status. Every revocation check becomes an extra round trip to the CA, which slows the first visit and, if the CA endpoint is unreachable or the visitor's network blocks it, leaves the browser without a usable revocation status.
Without it any CA may issue certificates for your domain, enabling a lookalike site with a valid padlock.
Without it, attackers can poison caches or forge answers and send visitors to a lookalike server that harvests credentials.
Without DKIM, mail integrity cannot be verified and DMARC loses one of its two authentication pillars. Note we probed only 46 common selectors, so a custom selector may exist.
Without it an attacker on the network path can force a downgrade to plaintext and read or modify mail such as contracts and payment details.
Without an enforcing DMARC policy most receivers still deliver forged mail to the inbox.
HTTPS-alt/admin on 36.112.43.173:8443 (hosts: knowledge-doc.petrochina.com.cn, knowledge-preview.petrochina.com.cn, knowledge.petrochina.com.cn) faces constant credential stuffing and exploit attempts; weak or default passwords often hand over full access in one try.
Missing Secure lets cookies travel in plaintext; missing HttpOnly lets injected scripts steal sessions; missing SameSite enables CSRF. Affected: BIGipServerdmz-80, EMPHPSID.
Without it, any injected script runs: session theft, fake payment forms, or card-skimming scripts on compromised pages. CSP limits the damage even when something else fails.
Exact versions let attackers look up ready-made exploits instead of probing - most intrusions start with a version scan.
Without it a file uploaded as an image can be executed as HTML/JavaScript on your domain, stealing same-site cookies and sessions.
Without it, attackers overlay a transparent frame of your page and trick users into clicking real actions such as transfers or password changes (clickjacking).
Everything above is what anyone can observe from the internet. Domain owners who verify ownership additionally get the full asset inventory — every subdomain with its open ports and running services — look-alike and typosquatting domains registered against the brand, credential-exposure monitoring, and copy-paste fixes for each finding.
Verify ownership of petrochina.com.cn (free) → Open the live interactive report →