Does 163.com have DMARC protection against email spoofing?

No. 163.com has a DMARC record, but its policy is p=none: receivers are asked to report spoofed mail rather than reject it, so forged messages still get delivered.

How is 163.com's D security grade calculated?

CyberTrust scores 163.com passively across 6 area(s) — external attack surface 100/100; reputation and credential exposure 100/100; DNS hygiene 84/100; email spoofing defences (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) 56/100; TLS encryption and certificates 44/100; HTTP security headers 0/100 — and combines them by weight into the overall score of 65/100, which maps to grade D.

How many subdomains does 163.com expose?

This scan observed 147 publicly resolvable subdomain(s) for 163.com. Verified owners get the full list, with each host's open ports and running services.

Public security report

163.com security rating

65/100

A means lowest risk and F means highest, like a school report card. How the score is calculated →

Scanned 2026-10-26 · 14 issue(s) found · 10 checks passed

Re-scan 163.com now

What this scan found

CyberTrust assessed 163.com passively — using only information that is publicly visible on the internet: DNS records, certificates, response headers and reachable services. The result is 65/100, grade D, where A means lowest risk and F means highest, like a school report card.

Email spoofing is possible: a DMARC record exists for 163.com, but its policy is p=none — receivers are asked to report spoofed mail, not to reject it.

Strongest area: external attack surface (100/100). Weakest area: HTTP security headers (0/100).

14 issue(s) need attention (1 high, 4 medium, 9 low), while 10 checks passed.

Infrastructure observed: mail is hosted by netease, traffic is fronted by aliyun-cdn, the web server identifies as tengine.

147 subdomain(s) of 163.com resolve publicly.

Score by category

Area	Score	Grade	Issues
DNS hygiene	84	B	2
email spoofing defences (SPF/DKIM/DMARC)	56	F	4
external attack surface	100	A	0
IP threat intelligence	—	—	0
reputation and credential exposure	100	A	0
TLS encryption and certificates	44	F	2
HTTP security headers	0	F	6

Issues found (14)

highHTTPS redirects back to HTTP

Redirecting to HTTP breaks encryption mid-visit: credentials submitted afterwards travel in plaintext and the padlock disappears.

1 asset(s) affected · worth +5 points · how to set HSTS, CSP and other security headers →

mediumOutdated TLS versions enabled (TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1)

Versions TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 are formally deprecated, fail PCI DSS requirements and are no longer supported by modern browsers; they also enable downgrade attacks and fail compliance audits.

6 asset(s) affected · worth +5 points · how to read an SSL/TLS certificate check →

mediumHSTS not enabled

Without it, an attacker can strip SSL on the first HTTP request and keep the user on plaintext (SSL stripping), a common attack on public Wi-Fi.

4 asset(s) affected · worth +4 points · how to set HSTS, CSP and other security headers →

mediumHTTP is not redirected to HTTPS

Visitors who type the bare domain land on an unencrypted connection and submit data in plaintext, with nothing on screen to warn them.

3 asset(s) affected · worth +4 points · how to set HSTS, CSP and other security headers →

mediumDMARC is monitor-only (p=none)

p=none does not stop anything - forged mail still reaches the inbox. It is only meant as an observation phase.

1 asset(s) affected · worth +4 points · check any domain's DMARC record with the free DMARC tool →

lowNo OCSP stapling

The server does not staple the certificate revocation status. Every revocation check becomes an extra round trip to the CA, which slows the first visit and, if the CA endpoint is unreachable or the visitor's network blocks it, leaves the browser without a usable revocation status.

7 asset(s) affected · worth +2 points · check a certificate with the free SSL tool →

lowNo Content Security Policy

Without it, any injected script runs: session theft, fake payment forms, or card-skimming scripts on compromised pages. CSP limits the damage even when something else fails.

4 asset(s) affected · worth +2 points · how to set HSTS, CSP and other security headers →

lowX-Content-Type-Options missing

Without it a file uploaded as an image can be executed as HTML/JavaScript on your domain, stealing same-site cookies and sessions.

4 asset(s) affected · worth +2 points · how to set HSTS, CSP and other security headers →

lowNo clickjacking protection

Without it, attackers overlay a transparent frame of your page and trick users into clicking real actions such as transfers or password changes (clickjacking).

4 asset(s) affected · worth +2 points · how to set HSTS, CSP and other security headers →

lowNo CAA record

Without it any CA may issue certificates for your domain, enabling a lookalike site with a valid padlock.

1 asset(s) affected · worth +1 points · see who can issue certificates with the free CAA tool →

lowDNSSEC not enabled

Without it, attackers can poison caches or forge answers and send visitors to a lookalike server that harvests credentials.

1 asset(s) affected · worth +1 points · what DNSSEC prevents and how to enable it →

lowNo DKIM key found on common selectors

Without DKIM, mail integrity cannot be verified and DMARC loses one of its two authentication pillars. Note we probed only 46 common selectors, so a custom selector may exist.

1 asset(s) affected · worth +1 points · look up DKIM keys with the free DKIM tool →

lowDMARC has no reporting address

Without it you are blind: you cannot see forgeries in circulation or unknown legitimate senders, so you can never safely tighten the policy.

1 asset(s) affected · worth +1 points · check any domain's DMARC record with the free DMARC tool →

lowNo MTA-STS policy

Without it an attacker on the network path can force a downgrade to plaintext and read or modify mail such as contracts and payment details.

1 asset(s) affected · worth +1 points · how to stop email spoofing with SPF, DKIM and DMARC →

Checks passed

Mail exchangers configured
SPF record is valid
Name servers are redundant
No API keys found in front-end bundles
No weak cipher suites accepted
Certificate is valid and trusted
Only modern TLS versions are enabled
No risky services found exposed
No shadow-AI services exposed
No mail-server IP on spam blocklists

What we detected

mail provider: netease
cdn: aliyun-cdn
web server: tengine
subdomain count: 147

What could not be fully checked

No BIMI record
BIMI shows your logo next to authenticated mail in supporting inboxes (requires an enforcing DMARC policy). It is a trust signal rather than a security control, so it does not affect your score.
No TLS-RPT record
TLS-RPT sends you reports when other servers fail to deliver mail to you securely. Recommended alongside MTA-STS.
No Referrer-Policy 4 host(s)
Browsers default to strict-origin-when-cross-origin today; setting it explicitly is good hygiene.
No Permissions-Policy 4 host(s)
Permissions-Policy disables powerful browser features (camera, microphone, geolocation) you do not use.
No security.txt
security.txt (RFC 9116) tells security researchers how to report vulnerabilities to you instead of posting them publicly.
Website returned an error page — partly unassessed 3 host(s)
The page returned HTTP 403 (often a firewall challenge for automated clients), so most header and content checks could not run. HSTS was still assessed where the response is reliable, but this category is only partially evaluated and its score should be read as incomplete.
Website not reachable 2 host(s)
The site could not be fetched, so its response headers and page content were not checked.
TLS 1.3 not enabled 2 host(s)
TLS 1.3 is faster and removes legacy cryptography. Recommended, but not required.
RSA key exchange still accepted 7 host(s)
Static RSA key exchange is kept for old clients. It lacks forward secrecy but is not scored when ECDHE is available.
HTTPS not available on port 443 3 host(s)
The TLS checks could not run on this host, so its TLS configuration was not verified.

Frequently asked questions about 163.com security

Does 163.com have DMARC protection against email spoofing?: No. 163.com has a DMARC record, but its policy is p=none: receivers are asked to report spoofed mail rather than reject it, so forged messages still get delivered.
How is 163.com's D security grade calculated?: CyberTrust scores 163.com passively across 6 area(s) — external attack surface 100/100; reputation and credential exposure 100/100; DNS hygiene 84/100; email spoofing defences (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) 56/100; TLS encryption and certificates 44/100; HTTP security headers 0/100 — and combines them by weight into the overall score of 65/100, which maps to grade D.
What is the most serious issue found on 163.com?: HTTPS redirects back to HTTP (severity high). Redirecting to HTTP breaks encryption mid-visit: credentials submitted afterwards travel in plaintext and the padlock disappears. Fixing it is worth about +5 points.
How many subdomains does 163.com expose?: This scan observed 147 publicly resolvable subdomain(s) for 163.com. Verified owners get the full list, with each host's open ports and running services.

What a verified owner of 163.com sees

Everything above is what anyone can observe from the internet. Domain owners who verify ownership additionally get the full asset inventory — every subdomain with its open ports and running services — look-alike and typosquatting domains registered against the brand, credential-exposure monitoring, and copy-paste fixes for each finding.

Verify ownership of 163.com (free) → Open the live interactive report →